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THE CLAIM-CENTERED APPROACH TO ARISINGUNDER JURISDICTION: A BRIEF REJOINDER TO
PROFESSOR MULLIGAN
Simona Grossi *
My claim-centered approach to arising-under jurisdiction fully
embraces the three subcategories of jurisdiction that Professor Mulligan
identifies. 1 My essential point is that the bifurcation (or trifurcation as
Professor Mulligan suggests) into separate doctrines has led to a
mechanical jurisprudence that is sometimes inconsistent with the
fundamental principles that ought to animate § 1331 jurisdictional
analysis. In my view, Gully v. First National Bank 2 illuminates those
fundamental principles by focusing on the role of the federal issue in the
case before the court. 3 That does not mean that Gully provides an easy
answer for all applications of arising-under jurisdiction; it does mean,
however, that Gully points to the fundamental question presented in the
jurisdictional analysis.
Professor Mulligan suggests that the Gully standard I endorse requires
an abstract consideration of the issue’s importance presented in the
case. 4 But this is not my view. As I explained in my article, Gully’s
“importance” inquiry pertains solely to the role that the federal issue
plays in the plaintiff’s claim: Does it lurk in the background or does it
operate in the foreground as an essential element of that claim? In fact,
one of my chief criticisms of the “rights separation” model advocated by
Professor Mulligan is that, as presently configured, it invites a subjective
determination of the importance of the federal issue to the federal
system, a determination that I believe is inappropriate to the
jurisdictional question. 5 My objection to the current bifurcated doctrinal
*
© 2013 Simona Grossi. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, J.S.D., U.C.
Berkeley School of Law, LL.M., U.C. Berkeley School of Law, J.D., L.U.I.S.S. Guido Carli, Rome,
Italy.
1. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Gully and the Failure to Stake a 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “Claim,” 89
WASH. L. REV. 441 (2014).
2. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
3. Id. at 114–15.
4. See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 1, at 459–60, 480.
5. See Simona Grossi, A Modified Theory of the Law of Federal Courts: The Case of Arising-
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approach is that, differently from my proposed unified model, it relies on
a subjective determination of whether the issue is somehow important as
perceived by the individual judge.
Professor Mulligan also argues that the Gully approach “leads to
unclear—meaning unpredictable ex ante—§ 1331 doctrine.” 6 But he
provides no proof of that claim other than the assertion that other
commentators have assumed that to be the case.7 In fact, Gully pinpoints
the essential jurisdictional question, i.e., the role of the federal issue
within the context of the claim asserted, and numerous cases preceding
Gully fully illuminate how that principle had been applied. 8 Thus, there
was no reason for the cases following Gully to stray from that course.
Parts III through VI of my article examine and critique the consequences
of straying from Gully’s principled approach. 9 My primary concern with
Professor Mulligan’s approach is that it conforms too easily to the
current jurisprudence of arising-under jurisdiction without addressing its
defects.
Of course, my claim-centered approach does fully embrace causes of
action, rights, and federal common law. The difference between my
approach and Professor Mulligan’s approach is that I do not see those
descriptive categories as calling for distinct doctrinal developments.
Instead, the analysis should gravitate around the essential, fundamental
question: Is the plaintiff’s claim truly about federal law? This question is
consistent with the text of § 1331, the contemporaneous interpretations
of that text, and the intent of Congress. It is also consistent with a federal
court’s obligation to exercise the jurisdiction Congress has conferred
upon it. 10 This approach also has the benefit of avoiding the necessity of
drawing clean distinctions among causes of action, rights, and common
law principles. Gully’s fundamental question is neither vague nor
difficult to apply. For the claim is truly about federal law when the
plaintiff needs to plead and prove an issue of federal law to prevail.
Finally, I do agree that a claim-centered jurisdictional inquiry
resembles the question of whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon

Under Jurisdiction, 88 WASH. L. REV. 961, 992, 997–99, 1003, 1114–17 (2013).
6. See Mulligan, supra note 1, at 482.
7. Id. n.218.
8. Gully, 299 U.S. at 112 (citing Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257 (1885); First Nat’l Bank
v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504, 512 (1920)).
9. See Grossi, supra note 5, at 987–1013.
10. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8 (1983)
(discussing federal courts’ obligation to decide cases).
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which relief can be granted. 11 However, the latter consideration involves
whether a claim has been stated, the former involves whether that claim
belongs in federal courts.

11. See Mulligan, supra note 1, at 442–43 (discussing Grossi, supra note 5).

